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EQUITABLE SERVITUDES: RESTRICTION ON TRANSFER
OF CHATTEL
PETER L. ALBRECHT*
In Nadell & Co. v. Grasso,' while defendant was its employee,
plaintiff, a concern engaged in buying and reselling goods damaged
in transit, bought a shipment of damaged brand-name goods frOm
a carrier with which it apparently did considerable business. The
sale contract, the terms of which defendant knew, required plain-
tiff to prevent the goods from being offered for sale at retail under
the brand name. At defendant's suggestion, plaintiff sold the goods
to Vizcarra, who agreed to repackage the goods prior to resale and
to return the original containers, lids, and labels to plaintiff. Defend-
ant assisted in drafting language requiring the return of such items
for inclusion in the invoice evidencing the sale. Defendant then left
plaintiff's employ, purchased the goods from Vizcarra, sold some of
them in their original containers to a retailer, and indicated his intent
to dispose similarly of the remainder. (The opinion does not so state,
but presumably the goods so sold to the retailer were next offered
for sale at retail in their original containers.) Plaintiff brought action
to enjoin further such sales by defendant. Held, judgment awarding
plaintiff a permanent injunction against the sale of the goods other-
wise than in accordance with the agreement between plaintiff and
the carrier affirmed.
Although the injunction thus speaks of the agreement between
plaintiff and the carrier and enforces against defendant the restrictions
on resale imposed in that agreement, the opinion suggests that the
court was enforcing against defendant an equitable servitude imposed
by the agreement between plaintiff and Vizcarra. 2 This apparent
inconsistency between decree and opinion makes little practical dif-
ference in the present case, since the result of the restrictions imposed
by both agreements is the same (although the Vizcarra agreement im-
posed an affirmative duty to return the containers which was not
present in the agreement with the carrier). Defendant knew the
terms of both agreements and, on the theory adopted by the California
court, could have been held to be bound by the restrictions of both.
Defendant argued that equitable servitudes could be imposed on
* A.B. 1952, LL.B. 1955, Harvard University; associated with the firm of Ropes,
Gray, Best, Coolidge & Rugg, of Boston.
1 175 Cal. App. 2d 449, 346 P.2d 505 (Calif. District Ct. of Appeal, 2d District,
Division 1, November 19, 1959).
2 346 P.2d at 508.
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personal property only by its manufacturer or, in the case of copy-
rights, the creator of the copyrighted matter. The court said, however,
that plaintiff's good will was property which would be injured in a
manner not compensable in damages if the restriction were not en-
forced, and seemed to espouse the theory that not only the manu-
facturer of a chattel but a subsequent transferee "who has his own
good will to maintain" could impose equitable servitudes upon the
chattel.3
This appears to be the only case involving equitable servitude on
chattels decided since Pratte v. Balatsos,4 which was the subject of a
notable comment by Chafee,5 an article to which the attention of the
California court appears not to have been directed. It is unfortunate
that the court did not, as Chafee recommends, "hesitate and scrutinize
carefully factors of social desirability before imposing novel burdens
on [personal] property in the hands of transferees."° One cannot
quarrel with the court's purpose; on these facts, defendant clearly
should not have been allowed with impunity to put plaintiff in default
under the latter's contract with the carrier. But plaintiff's case, how-
ever sympathetic, does not justify a theory whereby restrictions on
the transfer of chattels can be imposed by any person having a prop-
erty interest therein so long as each restriction can be said to benefit
the "good will" of the business of such person. In the present case,
for example, the language of the court would seem to permit the
manufacturer, the carrier, and the plaintiff, the carrier's vendee, to
impose equitable servitudes upon the chattels involved. In view of
the interest of the public in permitting the unrestricted transfer of
chattels, it would seem better to grant such power only to the manu-
facturer. In this case, it does not appear that the manufacturer sought
to exercise such power. It seems correct, as the court suggests, that
damages would not adequately compensate plaintiff if, as a result of
defendant's actions, plaintiff were not only sued by the carrier for
breach of contract but were also deprived of future profitable business
relations with the carrier. If, however, this inadequacy be balanced
against the possible inconvenience which could be caused to business
and the public generally by the application of the theory followed
by the court to other cases, it would seem that plaintiff's remedy
might better be limited to damages. (Query whether this court would
have regarded an action for damages as one in tort or in contract;
3 346 P.2d at 512.
4 99 N.H. 430, 113 A.2d 492 (1955).
5 The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 Harv.
L. Rev. 1250 (1956).
6 Chafee, op. cit., at 1261.
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although it is clear that defendant was not a party to either contract
containing a restriction, the court at times speaks as if it were specifi-
cally enforcing a contractual obligation in lieu of awarding damages
for its breach.)
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